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Avoiding a Death Sentence in the
American Legal System:
Get a Woman to Do It
Janice L. Kopec*
. Introduction
The death penalty in America has traditionally been a masculine affair.
American socialization is imbued with the world view that women are the more
genteel and the less culpable of the sexes. This persistent reluctance to impose
the ultimate sanction upon the gender sex has resulted in a gender disparity in
our capital system that has an adverse impact on male offenders. The root of
this disparity is so embedded in our national conscience that the actors in the
death penalty system often have fixed perceptions: a male murderer is danger-
ous, a female murderer is tragic. To undo this conundrum would require a
remedy that levels the very core of America's notions about gender--a remedy
that simply does not exist. Thus, the reality remains that men are executed at a
disproportionate rate to women. The justice system has, in deed if not in word,
all but ceased to execute female offenders. Because in all but the most extreme
cases, the death penalty has become an unconscionable penalty for women, equal
protection under the law demands that the same treatment is afforded to men.
II. An Overview of Women and the Death Penaly
A. Historical Perspective
About 20,000 executions have taken place in the United States during the
last four centuries; of these, only 562 involved female defendants.' Even when
the death penalty was a much more common punishment, women faced it less
often and for fewer crimes than men. In early America, men were executed for
stealing, but women were almost exclusively executed for homicide or
* J.D. Candidate, May 2004, Washington and Lee University School of Law; B.A., 1999,
College of the Holy Cross. The author would like to thank her parents and sister for their
continued support. She would also like to thank Professor Roger D. Groot and the students in the
Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse--particularly Pniya Nath, Kristen F. Grunewald, and Philip H.
Yoon-for their insight and assistance.
1. Victor L. Streib, Gendeing the Death Penaly: Countering Sex Bias in a Mascukne Sanctuary, 63
OHIO ST. L.J. 433,446 (2002) [hereinafter Streib, Genderin (providing a history of women who
received sentences of death).
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witchcraft.2 Forty-seven percent of the total number of American women who
have been executed were African-American, and a large portion of these women
were slaves executed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.3 Traditionally,
society shields women from harsher penalties in much the same way that it
exempts them from military danger.4 The notions of chivalry loom large when
considering the life and death of a woman, and these notions have not faded in
the modem era.
As capital punishment entered the twentieth century, the incidents of
female executions decreased even further. Only one woman in the twentieth
century was executed for any crime other than homicide, whereas men were
executed for other crimes until mid-century.' Thousands of men have been
executed in the last one hundred years, but only forty-nine women have suffered
the same fate.' In the modem era of the death penalty, 1976 until the present
day, this disparity has continued; only ten women have been executed compared
with 829 men.' Currently, women commit about one in every eight homicides,
but they are represented in less than one in every eighty executions.' This fact
illustrates that men are not simply more violent and therefore executed with
greater frequency; even when women do act violently they disproportionately
avoid execution.
2. Compare Victor L. Streib, Death Penalyfor Femak Offenders, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 845, 852
table 2 (1990) [hereinafter Streib, Femak Offenders] (listing only five women ever to be executed for
theft), with Margaret Vandiver & Michel Coconis, "Sentenced to the Punishment of Death ": Pre-Furman
Capital Crimes and Executions in Shelby County, Tennessee, 31 U. MEM. L. REV. 861,867 (2001) (providing
examples of older offenses that were punishable by death). "Tennessee's early laws were harsh,
with provisions for execution on the second offense for the crimes of horse stealing, theft of goods
to the value of ten dollars, forgery, perjury, and the burning of houses or barns." Id. at 867.
3. Streib, Female Offenders, supra note 2, at 853.
4. Victor L. Streib, Executing Women, Children, and the Retarded: Second Class Citizens in Capital
Punishment, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 201,220 Games R. Acker et.
al. eds., 1998).
5. Streib, Female Offenders, supra note 2, at 857. The exception to the homicide rule was the
execution of Ethel Rosenberg on June 13, 1953 for espionage. Id.
6. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., WOMEN AND THE DEATH PENALTY, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=24&did=229 (lastvisited Mar. 18,2003); see also
Streib, Gendeting, supra note 1, at 433 (stating that 3,827 men have been executed since 1930).
7. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., WOMEN AND THE DEATH PENALTY at
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=230&scid=24 (last visited Mar. 18, 2003) (listing ten
women who have been executed since 1976); DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., NUMBER OF EXECU-
TIONS BY YEAR SINCE 1976, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicexec.hml (last updated Mar.
20,2003) (listing total number of executions from 1976-2003 as 839). The modern era of the death
penalty is typically bracketed from 1976 to the present day. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207
(1976) (holding that the death penalty in Georgia does not violate the constitution).
8. Elizabeth Rapaport, Some QuestionsAbout Gender and the Death Penalo, 20 GOLDEN GATE
U. L. REV. 501,504-05 (1990) [hereinafter Rapaport, Some Questions] (explaining the average number
of homicides which are perpetrated by women); see DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., WOMEN AND
THE DEATH PENALTY, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 15:2
WOMEN & THE DEATH PENALTY
B. Why Women Atr Rarely Executed
1. Paterwaksm
The American legal system has an entrenched history of paternalism.
Political participation and the right to sit on a jury were denied to women in part
because these tasks were considered too difficult and burdensome for the weaker
sex.9 The lingering ideals of male protector and chivalric duty cling even to the
female criminal. Early in the twentieth century, thirty male prisoners petitioned
for a commutation of Eithel Spinelli's death sentence."0 The men volunteered
to draw straws and die in her stead so that the state's record of only executing
men would not be tarnished." In the modern era, only twenty-three out of the
thirty-nine death penalty jurisdictions have imposed a sentence of death on a
female, and only six of those jurisdictions have actually carried out the
sentences. 12 Even in the state of Texas, where the death penalty enjoys a wide
base of popular support, the execution of Karla Faye Tucker was divisive and
drew a considerable amount of public outcry.'
3
2. Statutory Cassifications of CapitalMurder
Most capital murder statutes are designed in such a way that men are much
more likely to be charged with a capital crime.'4 As many as eighty percent of
the offenders on death row were convicted of felony murder." Yet, only six
percent of accused felony murderers are female. 6 The Virginia capital murder
9. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (rejecting a
woman's request to practice law in part because "[t]he paramount destiny and mission of woman
are to fulfil [sic] the noble and benign offices of wife and mother"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX
(stating that the right to vote "shall not be denied.., on account of sex"); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S.
57, 62 (1961) (upholding a law which placed women on jury rosters only upon request because a
"woman is still regarded as the center of home and family life"), owmkd by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 537-38 (1975) (holding that a jury must contain a cross-section of the community and
may not exclude distinctive groups such as women).
10. See Rapaport, SomeQuestions, supra note 8, at 501 (inferring that the thirty inmates who
were willing to be executed in Spinelli's stead were men based on the reason for their protest).
11. Id.
12. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., WOMEN AND THE DEATH PENALTY at
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=230&scid=24 (last visited Mar. 18, 2003) (listing the
women executed in the modem era and the states that executed them); DEATH PENALTY INFOR-
MATION CENTER, STATE BY STATE DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/firstpage.htrnl (last visited Mar. 18, 2003) (listing thirty-eight
states and the federal government as death penalty jurisdictions).
13. Streib, Gendering, supra note 1, at 451-53.
14. Rapaport, Some Questions, supra note 8, at 509.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 509.
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statutes, for example, include three types of felony murder that are typically
committed by male offenders: "The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing
of any person in the commission" of sex offenses, robbery, or abduction.'7 In
the modern era of executions, Virginia has executed eighty-seven men, but not
a single woman.'"
Not only do women tend not to engage in felony murder, but the types of
murder they do carry out are usually not considered capital crimes. 9 Women are
more likely to act without premeditation when committing a homicide, rendering
their offenses statutorily less serious and often precluding a capital charge.2"
Women typically commit "domestic homicides."'" They often kill in the midst
of the rage and fear of a domestic altercation; therefore, they lack the premedita-
tion necessary for prosecutors to prove even first-degree murder, let alone
capital murder.2
3. Effects of Mitgators and Aggravators
The use of aggravating and mitigating factors in capital sentencing proceed-
ings often have a benevolent impact on women and a negative impact on men.23
Many capital systems include future dangerousness, a prior history of violence,
or both, among their statutory aggravators.z4 Women are more likely than men
to be first-time offenders with little or no criminal record.2" Because of this fact,
when a prior history of violence is a statutory aggravator, men are at a greater
disadvantage before the sentencing jury than women. Judges and juries alike also
tend to perceive women as less dangerous and more open to rehabilitation than
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(1) (Michie Supp. 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (4) (Michie
Supp. 2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(5) (Michie Supp. 2002). Virginia's modem executions in
reliance on these three statutes have only targeted men. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
18. VIRGINIANS FORALTERNATIVES TOTHE DEATH PENALTY, EXECUTION INFORMATION,
at http://www.vadp.org/exinfo.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2003).
19. Streib, Gendeing, supra note 1, at 459.
20. Id. at 458, 458 n.130.
21. Id. at 458. Domestic homicide is defined as the killing of a relative or a sexual intimate.
Id.
22. Id. at 458, 458 n.130.
23. Id. at 459.
24. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3592(C)(2)-(4), (10), (12), (15) (2000) (listing six Federal Death
Penalty aggravators which involve prior convictions); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. §
37.071 (2)(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2003) (stating that the jury must decide if the defendantwill continue
to commit violent acts and continue to threaten society); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(a)-(b)(West
2001) (listing two aggravating factors which involve past criminal conduct); VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-
264.4(C) (Michie 2000) (stating that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant "would constitute a continuing serious threat to society").
25. Streib, Gendering, supra note 1, at 461.
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their male counterparts.26 This perception insulates women from prosecutorial
assertions of future dangerousness.
Mitigating factors often benefit female offenders more than they benefit
male offenders.27 Mitigating factors can include extreme mental or emotional
disturbance, substantial domination by another, character, circumstances, and
family background.28 Juries are often more open to believing that a female, as
opposed to a male, has been dominated or influenced by a stronger party or that
she might have suffered from duress or an emotional disturbance.29 Moreover,
the burden of leaving behind motherless children presumably weighs more
heavily on a jury than the burden of leaving behind fatherless children.3" A
woman who kills is not likely to kill in a manner punishable by death, but even
if she does, juries are difficult to convince that the requisite aggravators are
present, and they are more sympathetic to mitigating factors.
C. Modern Era Executions and the 'Evil Woman" Theory
In the modem era of capital punishment, the American taboo surrounding
the execution of women has grown even more pronounced. However, re-
instatement of the death penalty has not brought about a perfect record. Na-
tionwide, there are currently fifty-two women on death row and ten women have
been executed since 1976."1 These exceptions illustrate the rare circumstances
in which American juries will disregard their distaste for female executions and
26. Streib, Female Offenders, supra note 2, at 875 (stating that observers view women as less
dangerous and "better candidates for" rehabilitation than men); Deborah W. Denno, Gender, Crime,
andthe Crimina/Law Defenses, 85J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 80,94 (1994) (stating that researchers
have found that "females are far less likely than males to repeat their violent offenses; and...
females are far more likely to desist from further violence").
27. Streib, Gendering, supra note 1, at 463.
28. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a) (2000) (listing impaired capacity, duress, minor participation,
equal culpability, no prior criminal record, and disturbance as mitigating factors in the Federal
Death Penalty Act); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6) (West 2001) (listing as mitigating factors no prior
criminal history, mental or emotional disturbance, minor participation, duress or substantial
domination by another, and background); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (West Supp. 2002)
(listing duress, mental defect, lack of criminal history, and minor participation as mitigating factors);
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51 (1994) (listing lack of criminal history, mental or emotional disturbance,
minor participation, duress or substantial domination, and mental incapacity as mitigating factors);
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie 2000) (including as examples of mitigating factors a lack
of criminal history, impaired capacity, and mental or emotional disturbance).
29. Streib, Genderin, supra note 1, at 462-63.
30. In a federal prosecution, the Government sought the death penalty against Kristen
Gilbert. Adam Gorlick, Nurse Sentenced to Life in Prison for Kilng Patients at Hospital, THE Associ-
ATED PRESS, Mar. 26, 2001, 2001 WL 16547737. Gilbert worked as a nurse in a veterans hospital
and killed several of her patients. Id. Gilbert, however, received a life sentence from the jury after
her family pleaded for mercy on behalf of her children. Id.
31. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., WOMEN AND THE DEATH PENALTY, at
www.deathpenaltyinfoorg/womenstats.html (last updated Jan. 1, 2003).
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impose a traditionally "male" penalty. A prominent theory offered to explain
these exceptions is labeled the "evil woman theory." This theory centers around
the roles the defendant women were in when they carried out their crimes.
These roles include wives, mothers, nurses, and prostitutes.32 Nine out of the
ten women who were executed were acting in the capacity of a traditional female
role, endowed with a certain amount of expectation and trust from society at
large.33 The "evil women" acted out from feminine roles and killed victims who
had placed themselves at the mercy of the feminine expectations built into these
relationships.34 Scholars have theorized that by "acting out" from the duties of
these roles, the defendants defiled society's notions of womanhood and lost the
protection that femininity typically affords them in the jury room.35 One way of
interpreting this phenomenon is that these women destroyed the veneer that
their gender usually gives them; in short, they opened themselvesup to mascu-
line penalties.36 Under this theory, with only one exception, every modem day
execution has targeted a man, or a woman who has rejected the comforts of her
gender and who is therefore viewed by society as a masculine offender. An
overview of the ten modem era female executions is critical to illustrate just how
rare these events are, and to understand the similarities between each of the
crimes that bolster the "evil woman" theory.
The first of the modem era executions took place on November 2, 1984 in
North Carolina.37 A jury sentenced Velma Barfield ("Barfield") to death for
32. These roles are not limited to the modern era; historically, 274 of the total number of
female executions were for homicide and a large portion of these homicides involved a woman who
killed her child, her husband, or her lover. Streib, Femak Offenders, supra note 2, at 851.
33. One of the executions does not comply with the evil woman theory. The state of
Alabama executed Lynda Lyon Block for murdering a police officer with her common-law
husband. Todd Kleffman, State Executes Block, MONTGOMERYADvERTISER, May 10, 2002, available
at http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/htnl/death/US/block775.htm. Block never filed an appeal
and was executed on May 10, 2002. Id.
34. See infra note 35 (explaining how modem scholars define the relationship between
defendant women and society's gender expectations).
35. Andrea Shapiro, Unequal Bfore the Law: Men, Women and the Death Penaly, 8 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 427,459 (2000), WL 8AMUJGSPL 427 (explaining that when a woman
strays from an expected feminine role and "offends society as a whole with her 'unladylike'
behavior," judges and juries lose their reluctance to sentence her to death);Jenny E. Carroll, Images
of Women and Capital Sentencing Among Femak Offenders: Exploring the Outer Limits of the Eighth Amend-
ment andArticulated Theories ofjusice, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1413, 1421 (1997) [hereinafter Carroll, Images
of Women] (positing that when women offend society's notions of femininity, they lose the benefits
and protections that their gender normally provides them with); Rapaport, Some Questions, supra note
8, at 512-13 (theorizing that women who commit typically male offenses or defy gender norm
expectations are punished in the same manner as men); Denno, supra note 26, at 86 (stating that
"society deems women who engage in crime to be 'doubly deviant'-defying both the law and their
gender role").
36. Carroll, Images of Women, supra note 35, at 1421-22 (explaining that when women defy
their gender they "transcend notions of femininity" and join their male counterparts as death
eligible).
37. Streib, Gendering, supra note 1, at 450.
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poisoning her boyfriend with arsenic.3" Barfield also admitted that she poisoned
her mother, and that while she was acting as a nurse to an elderly couple, she
poisoned them as well. 9 Barfield was also suspected of poisoning her husband
several years earlier.' Barfield acted out from her roles of girlfriend, wife,
daughter, and nurse by preying on those closest to her and violating the trust
they placed in her feminine capacity.
After Barfield's execution, 407 men were executed before another state put
a woman to death.4' On February 3, 1998, the state of Texas executed Karla
Faye Tucker ("Tucker").42 Texas, never shy to impose the death penalty, had not
executed a woman since 1863 and Tucker's execution drew a torrent of media
attention.43 Tucker's sensational crime was the murder of two sleeping victims
with a pickax.' Tucker boasted that with each blow of the pickax she reached
sexual climaxes and was described as a woman who killed "like a man. ' 4' The
brutality of Tucker's crime and her sexualized description of the murders com-
bined with her involvement in drugs and prostitution to create an image of a
woman casting aside the garb of femininity and trampling traditional notions of
gender.
Judias Buenoano ("Goodyear') was executed a few weeks later on March
30, 1998, in Florida.' Over the course of two weeks, Goodyear slowly poisoned
her husband with arsenic after he returned home from a tour of duty in
Vietnam. 47 After his death, she collected her husband's veteran benefits as well
as several life insurance policies. 48 Next, Goodyear poisoned a boyfriend and
collected on three separate insurance policies. Finally, she attempted to kill her
fiance, again to collect on a life insurance policy.49 During Goodyear's appeal,
the court pointed out that all three of her victims "established a close relation-
38. State v. Barfield, 259 S.E.2d 510, 519, 523 (N.C. 1979) (declining to set aside Barfield's
sentence of death).
39. Streib, Gendering, spra note 1, at 450; Bafie/d, 259 S.E.2d at 527.
40. Streib, Gendering, supra note 1, at 450; Barfield, 259 S.E.2d at 521-22.
41. Streib, Gendering, smpra note 1, at 450.
42. Id. at 451; see Tucker v. State, 771 S.W.2d 523, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (affirming
Tucker's conviction of capital murder).
43. Streib, Gendering, supra note 1, at 451-52.
44. Id. at 452; Tucker, 771 S.W.2d at 525.
45. Tucker, 771 S.W.2d at 526-27; Streib, Gendering, xspra note 1, at 452. The court recounted
Tucker's description of the events in its recitation of the facts: "There, she related the events of
the morning to Doug, describing how she and Danny had 'offed Jerry Dean last night.' She said,
'Dan hit him with the hammer and I picked him,' and 'Doug, I come with every stroke' of the
pickax." Tucker, 771 S.W.2d at 526-27.
46. Streib, Gendering, supra note 1, at 453.
47. Buenoano v. State, 527 So. 2d 194,195-96,199 (Fla. 1988) (affirming first-degree murder
conviction and sentence of death).
48. Id. at 196.
49. Id.
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ship with ... [Goodyear] either as her husband, common-law husband or
fianc." ° The court concluded that her sentence of death was appropriate in
part because "[slystematically poisoning one's husband over a period of time
until it causes death and witnessing the effects of the poison is an unusual
manner and method of committing a homicide.""1 The court also noted that
Goodyear gave her final victim vitamin C tablets when he caught a cold. 2 The
tablets, which actually contained arsenic, led to the hospitalization of Goodyear's
fianc6. 3 In all three cases, Goodyear sullied the traditional notions of caretaker
and nurturer by delivering the poison to her unsuspecting partners and watching
them die. The court's concern with the manner and relationships involved in
Goodyear's crimes lends support for the "evil woman" theory.
The state of Texas executed a second woman, Betty Lou Beets ("Beets"),
two years later on February 24, 2000.54 Several years after Beets's husband
apparently disappeared in a fishing accident, his body was discovered in a
wishing well on his property; the body of another of Beets's former husbands
was also discovered on the property.5 5 After her husband's disappearance, Beets
inquired about recovering from his life insurance policy and his pension
benefits.5 6 When she learned that she would have to wait seven years to recover
due to the missing body, she attempted to sell some of his property and their
house mysteriously burned down. At trial, Beets also admitted to shooting
another former husband in the side and the stomach." Like Goodyear, Beets
repeatedly attacked her partners and, in at least one case, evidence was presented
to demonstrate a motive of financial gain. The lengthy facts presented in the
appellate court's opinion record not only Beets's actions, but also the involve-
ment of two of her children in the murders.5 ' The jury and the court may have
viewed Beets not only as a murderer of her men, but also as a corrupter of the
50. Id. at 197.
51. Id. at 199.
52. Id. at 196.
53. Buenoano, 527 So.2d at 196.
54. Streib, Gendeing, supra note 1, at 454.
55. Beets v. State, 767 S.W.2d 711, 715-17 (rex. Crim. App. 1987).
56. Id. at 716.
57. Id. at 716 n.7, 716-17.
58. Id. at 722.
59. Id. at 717-19. The court's opinion included portions of the testimony of Beets's daughter
Shirley:
She told [Shirley] that she waited until [Barker] went to sleep and then she got the gun
and covered it with a pillow and pulled the trigr ... Thereafter, Shirley assisted her
mother in disposing of Barker's body: 'We dug him from the trailer outside to the
back and put him in the hole that had already been dug [in order to build a barbecue
pit].,
Id. at 718-19. The court's opinion contained a similar passage which described how Beets's son
Robbie helped his mother bury her other husband. Id. at 718.
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home because she used her children to help her hide the bodies. Beets not only
tainted her own femininity by killing her husbands, but she used her ultimate
feminine power-motherhood-to implicate her children in her own wrongdo-
ing.
The state of Arkansas executed Christina Marie Riggs ("Riggs") on May 2,
2000.60 Riggs worked as a nurse at the Arkansas Heart Hospital in Little Rock.61
On November 4, 1997, Riggs took home the antidepressant Elavil, morphine,
and potassium chloride.62 Riggs had two children, ages two and five, and she
injected both children with the Elavil to put them to sleep.63 She then injected
her older child with the potassium chloride; he awoke crying from the pain of
the poison at which point Riggs injected him with morphine.64 When the drug
did not calm him, Riggs smothered him with a pillow.6" She then smothered her
second child, later telling police that her second child only fought "a little bit."66
Riggs then wrote several suicide notes, took a large dose of Elavil, and injected
herself with potassium chloride.67 She was discovered the next day and
survived.6" Riggs confessed and pleaded not guilty by reason of mental defect.69
The jury rejected her defense of mental defect and found her guilty on two
counts of capital murder." Riggs asked for a sentence of death; the jury obliged
her.7t Riggs took advantage of her position as a nurse to prey upon her children
and commit perhaps the ultimate anti-feminine act: infanticide.
On January 1, 2001, the state of Oklahoma executed Wanda Jean Allen
("Allen").z After a domestic dispute, Allen shot and killed her gay lover in front
of a police station.73 The prosecutor played upon homosexual stereotypes during
Allen's trial and despite being borderline mentally retarded, Allen was sentenced
to death.74 Allen had been convicted previously for manslaughter after having
60. Streib, Gendeing, supra note 1, at 454.
61. Riggs v. State, 3 S.W.3d 305, 307 (Ark. 1999).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 308.
67. Riggs, 3 S.W.3d at 308.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Streib, Gendering, supra note 1, at 455.
73. Allen v. State, 871 P.2d 79, 86 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
74. David Kirby, IWas Justice Served? The Execution of a Lesbian Raises Tough .Quesions About the
Death Penal#, THE ADVOC., Feb. 27, 2001, at http://www.advocate.com/htmd/stories/
832/832_wandajean.asp. "They point to such statements as one by the prosecutor in which he said
Allen was the one who 'wore the pants' in the relationship with Leathers." Id.
20031
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pistol-whipped and shot another former lover.75 The prosecutor used this
conviction as evidence that Allen was a continuing threat to society.76 On its
face, Allen's crime appears to be a heat of passion offense, which is not typically
treated as a capital murder. The prominent role her sexuality played evidences
again that when a woman acts out from society's gender expectations, she faces
harsher penalties.
Months after Allen's execution, Oklahoma executed its second woman,
Marilyn Kay Plantz ("Plantz") on May 1, 2001."7 Plantz wanted to collect on her
husband's life insurance, which totaled approximately $299,000.8 She enlisted
her lover and one of his friends to kill her husband.7 9 After several botched
attempts, the two men beat Plantz's husband with baseball bats in her home
while her two young children slept in their bedrooms."0 Plantz then directed the
men to drive her husband away in his pickup, burn him, and leave him on the
side of the road.8 The men complied and noted that the victim was not yet dead
when they lit him on fire. 2 Plantz's violation of the marital trust, combined with
the masculine brutality of her orders, awarded her a sentence of death.
Lois Nadean Smith ("Smith") murdered her son's girlfriend on July 4,
1982.83 Smith choked the victim, stabbed her in the throat, and then drove her
to another location. 4 Smith sat the victim in a recliner and taunted her with a
revolver, shot the chair, and wounded the victim. 5 Smith then jumped on the
victim's neck and laughed as her son reloaded the revolver; finally, Smith shot
the victim several more times and killed her. 6 Smith's crime creates another
picture of a sinister mother, using her matriarchal power to kill her victim and
corrupt her son. The state of Oklahoma executed Smith on December 4,2001."
The state of Florida executed a female serial killer, Aileen Wuomos
("Wuornos"), on October 9, 2002.8 Wuomos was a prostitute who worked
75. Allen, 871 P.2d at 103-04.
76. Id. at 104.
77. Streib, Gendering, supra note 1, at 456. Plantz was a twenty-eight year old white woman
and her two conspirators were black teenagers. Id.
78. Plantz v. State, 876 P.2d 268, 271 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
79. Id. at 271-72.
80. Id. at 272-73.
81. Id. at 272.
82. Id.
83. Smith v. State, 727 P.2d 1366, 1368 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Oklahoma Department of Corrections, at http://www.doc.state.ok.us/DOCS
/CapitalP.HTM (last updated Mar. 20, 2003).
88. Female Senal Killer in Flonda Put to Death by Lethal Injection, JEFFERSON CITY NEWS
TRIBUNE ONLINE EDITION, Oct. 9, 2002, http://wwv.newstribune.com/stories.
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interstate exits along the Central Florida highways.5 9 Wuomos claimed that one
of her customers tied her hands to a steering wheel, violently raped her, and
threatened to kill her.9' She claimed she shot him in self-defense.9 She was
convicted of five other murders, each a customer, and in each case she claimed
self-defense. 92 At trial, the prosecutor described Wuomos as a " 'predatory
prostitute' whose 'appetite for lust and control had taken a lethal turn,' who 'had
been exercising control for years over men,' and who 'killed for power, for full
and ultimate control.' "9' The prosecution used Wuomos's gay lover as the star
witness against her.94 Wuomos's jury took less than two hours to return a guilty
verdict and less than two hours to sentence her to death.9" Wuomos inverted a
relationship where typically the woman is subordinate and often victimized; a
serial killer prostitute was a frightening spin on the more typical story of a male
serial killer who hunts prostitutes." This inversion and Wuomos's sexuality fit
the evil woman exception-she used her sexuality to disarm her victims and
murder them when they were most vulnerable.97
Nine of the ten women executed in the modem era fall into the evil woman
theory; their actions so horrified traditional gender expectations that they
forfeited their femininity and were treated like men. These women and their
crimes support the hypothesis that American juries will sentence only masculine
offenders to death. Women are protected from death through the statutory
construction of capital crimes, prosecutorial discretion, the reliance on mitigating
and aggravating factors to control death sentences, and finally by the perceptions
of individual jurors in the jury room. These conditions point to the conclusion
that the American populace has in effect determined that death is an inappropri-
ate punishment for women.
89. Wuomos v. State, 644 So. 2d 1000, 1004 (Fla. 1994).
90. Id. at 1004.
91. Id.; Phyllis Chesler, Sexual Vioknce Against Women and a Voman's Right to Se#-Defense: The
Case of Aileen Carol Wuornos, CRIM. PRAC. L. REP. 1993, at 1, 3, http://www.phyis-
Chesler.com/publications/sexual.violence.html.
92. Chesler, supra note 91, at 7.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 8.
96. Oliver Burkeman, Florida Executes Voman Serial Killer, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 10, 2002,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/intemational/story/0,3604,808734,00.html.
Mr[.] Singhal said Wuomos's gender had been the determining factor. "If this was
flipped around, and a male serial killer was preying on women prostitutes-that's
typically not a death-penalty case, but a life imprisonment case. Even Ted Bundy [who
probably killed at least 36 women] was offered life .... This case has been reaching
or death from day one."
Id.
97. Vuornos, 644 So. 2d at 1004 (describing the bodies of several of Wuornos's victims which
were discovered in remote locations and often were nude).
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However, an impression of national gender discrimination does not neces-
sarily equate to a constitutional violation. The fact remains that six states have
enforced the death penalty against women and that the rate of female executions
has increased significantly in the past five years.9" The theoretical reasons
explaining these ten executions are compelling; nonetheless, feminist theory
cannot erase the fact that some juries, in some states, are overcoming their
reluctance to impose death sentences on women. Because of the relative incon-
sistencies in the national scene, the strongest arena in which to mount a gender
challenge to the death penalty is an active death penalty state which never
executes female offenders.
D. The Modern Era Death Penaly in Virginia
Since 1976, Virginia has executed eighty-seven men, but not a single
woman.99 Currently, there are thirty men on death row, but not a single
woman."° These facts do not mean that women in Virginia refrain from com-
mitting murder. In 1999, women committed twenty-four murders,"0 ' in 2000
they committed forty-nine," 2 and in 2001 they committed forty-two. 3 Men in
Virginia committed 152 murders in 1999,"° 346 murders in 2000,0° and 333
murders in 2001. °6 Between 1999 and 2001 sixteen men received death sen-
tences in Virginia.'07 Because women have committed about one in every eight
homicides in that time, it stands to reason that at least two women should have
98. Between the years 1976 and 1998 only one woman was executed; however, in the five
year span between 1998 and 2003, nine women were executed. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
WOMEN AND THE DEATH PENALTY, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=24
&did=229 (last visited Mar. 18, 2003). Three states, Florida, Texas, and Oklahoma, each executed
more than one woman in those five years. Id.
99. VIRGINIANS FORALTERNATIVESTOTHE DEATH PENALTY, EXECUTION INFORMATION
at www.vadp.org/exinfo.htm (last modified Nov. 14, 2002).
100. VIRGINIANS FORALTERNATIVES TO THE DEATH PENALTY, VIRGINIA DEATH PENALTY
INFORMATION, at http://www.vadp.org/info.htm (last modified Nov. 14, 2002).
101. VIRGINIA STATE POLICE: CRIME STATISTICS, MURDER/NONNEGIGENTMANSLAUGH-
TER OFFENDERS BY AGE, GENDER, AND RACE 12, at http://www.vsp.state.va.us/Crime-in_
Virginia1999.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2003).
102. VIRGINIA STATE POLICE: CRIME STATISTICS, MURDER/NONNEGLIGENT MANSLAUGH-
TER OFFENDERS BY AGE, GENDER, AND RACE 12, at http://www.vsp.state.va.us/Crime-in_
Virginia_2000.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2003).
103. VIRGINIA STATE POLICE: CRIME STATISTICS, MURDER/NONNEGLIGENTMANSLAUGH-
TER OFFENDERS BY AGE, GENDER, AND RACE 12, at http://www.vsp.state.va.us/Crime_in_
Virginia_2001.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2003).
104. VIRGINIA STATE POLICE: CRIME STATISTICS, supra note 101, at 12.
105. VIRGINIA STATE POLICE: CRIME STATISTICS, supra note 102, at 12.
106. VIRGINIA STATE POLICE: CRIME STATISTICS, supra note 103, at 12.
107. VIRGINIANS FOR ALTERNATIVES TO THE DEATH PENALTY, EXECUTION INFORMATION,
at http://www.vadp.org/menrow.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2003).
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been sentenced to death.' Instead, the last time Virginia executed a woman was
on August 16, 1912."°9
Several factors contribute to the lack of female executions in Virginia.
Virginia's capital murder statute targets felony murder which is typically, though
not always, a male offense. 0 When women do commit death-worthy crimes,
juries and judges are reluctant to sentence them to death. Kelley Ann Tibbs
("Tibbs') and Donica Chantel Winckler ("Winckler") were both charged with
capital murder for robbing and killing another woman.' Tibbs and Winckler
participated in a group beating of the victim, cut her with box cutters, and stole
her jewelry." 2 A short time afterwards, both women participated in a second
beating which resulted in the victim's death." 3 All of the women who partici-
pated in the crime, as well as the victim, were gay."' Winckler was also an
African-American."' Both Tibbs and Winckler were convicted of capital
murder." 6 Tibbs was sentenced to life and Winckler was sentenced to death."7
However, the trial court overruled the jury and fixed Winckler's sentence at life
imprisonment."' In the rare instance that a jury actually imposed a sentence of
death, the final protection of judicial discretion saved Winckler from execution.
This deferential treatment of women is not solely the result of sympathetic
juries or a subtle bias in the statutory system. Prosecutorial discretion plays
perhaps the most crucial role in keeping female defendants out of the capital
murder system. Prosecutorial discretion manifests itself through plea arrange-
ments and through charging decisions. For example, Betty Jean Angeline
("Angeline") was charged with and pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and
capital murder for the shooting of two women."9 As part of a plea arrangement,
108. Of the murders for which gender is known that occurred between 1999 and 2001,
women committed 115 and men have committed 831. See VIRGINIA STATE POLICE: CRIME
STATISTICS, supra notes 101-106 (listing the number of male and female murderers in Virginia in
1999, 2000, 2001).
109. DEATH PENALTY FOR FEMALE OFFENDERS JANUARY 1, 1973, THROUGH DECEMBER
31,2002, http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/femdeath.htm.
110. See infra note 219 (listing the number of executions in Virginia for the crime of felony
murder).
111. Tibbs v. Commonwealth, 525 S.E.2d 579, 580-81 (Va. Ct. App. 2000); Winckler v.
Commonwealth, 531 S.E.2d 45,46 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
112. Tibbs, 525 S.E.2d at 581-83.
113. Id.
114. Winckkr, 531 S.E.2d at 47.
115. Michael Paul Williams, DoesJustice Peep Through Her Blindfold?, RICH. TIMES- DISPATCH,
Feb. 9, 1998, at B1, 1998 WL 100021291.
116. Tibbs, 525 S.E.2d at 580; Winckler, 531 S.E.2d at 48.
117. Tibbs, 525 S.E.2d at 580; Winckler, 531 S.E.2d at 48.
118. Winckler, 531 S.E.2d at 48.
119. Plea Bings Details in 2Murders To Ligbt, ROANOKETIMES, Nov. 13,2001, at B1, 2001 WL
25129578.
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Angeline was sentenced to two consecutive life terms. 2 ° Two women, Kia
Yovah Brooks ("Brooks") and Brandi Nicole Dalton ("Dalton"), who allegedly
participated in the slaying and robbery of a Richmond man, were charged with
first-degree murder and robbery.12' Brooks and Dalton could have been charged
with capital murder pursuant to Virginia Code Section 18.2-31(4).122 Jodie
Elizabeth Brown ("Brown") attempted to purchase cocaine and ended up
murdering the seller.2 3 Brown stabbed her victim seventy-two times; she was
sentenced to twenty-five years for first-degree murder.' 24 Brown could have
been charged with capital murder pursuant to Section 18.2-31(9)."2' Naquisha
Silver ("Silver") was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and received
four life sentences.'26 Silver participated in the murder of two women who were
sexually assaulted and beaten to death.' She also participated in the malicious
wounding of a third victim who was burned on over forty percent of her body
and eventually required the amputation of all four of her limbs. 2 Silver could
have been charged with capital murder pursuant to Section 18.2-31(7)."
Rebecca L. Scott ("Scott") offered two of her friends fifteen-hundred dollars to
whomever killed her father first; one friend promptly shot Scott's father.' 31 Scott
was convicted of first-degree murder, but it does not appear that she was ever
charged with capital murder pursuant to Section 18.2-31(10).1'' Lavada
Madeshia Tucker ("Tucker") and two men attacked three people in an armed
drug robbery.'32 Two of the victims were killed. 133 The two men Tucker was
120. Id.
121. Mark Bowes, Six Charged in Robber7yKilng" 19-Year-Old's Body Was Found in His Car, RICH.
TIMEs-DISPATCH, Dec. 12, 2001, at BI, 2001 WL5341739.
122. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(4) (Michie Supp. 2002) (defining capital murder as "[tihe
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the commission of robbery or
attempted robbery").
123. Alan Cooper, Woman Gets 25 Years in Gioin Court Death, Prison Term Leave [sic] Seven
Children Motherkss, RICH. 'TMEs-DISPATCH, July 31, 2001, at B3, 2001 WL 5329842.
124. Id.
125. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(9) (Michie Supp. 2002) (defining capital murder as "[tihe
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person" while violating the controlled substance
statute when the killing is done in furtherance of the violation).
126. Alan Cooper, Cio Woman Gets 4 Life Terms, Judge Cites Dpraio of Doubk Murder, RICH.
TIMEs-DISPATCH, June 21, 2001, at B1, 2001 WL 5326721.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(7) (Michie Supp. 2002) (defining capital murder as "[tihe
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of more than one person as a part of the same act or
transaction").
130. Scott v. Commonwealth, No. 2132-00-1, 2001 WL 316159, at "1, *2 (Va. Ct. App. Apr.
3, 2001).
131. Id., at *1; see VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(10) (Michie Supp. 2002) (defining capital murder
as murder for hire).
132. Alexandria Woman Charged in Slayings, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2002, at B02, 2002 WL
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with were charged with capital murder; Tucker was charged with two counts of
felony murder.' Women are not innocent of committing the more gruesome
murders that often result in capital sentences for men, but prosecutorial discre-
tion prevents them from being charged with capital murder.
Moreover, prosecutorial discretion is not likely to be balanced by changes
to Virginia's capital murder statutes. At the end of the 1980s and into the 1990s,
several women killed infants or young children; the bodies of the dead children
possessed signs of chronic abuse. 35 Possibly the most notorious of these cases
involved Karen Diehl ("Diehl"). Diehl and her husband raised sixteen children,
thirteen of whom were adopted, in a converted bus.'36 Diehl kept one thirteen-
year old boy naked and tied to the floor of the bus and tortured him.'37 Rescue
workers discovered the child clinically dead, but revived him and he lingered in
a coma for five days. 3' The child weighed seventy pounds and died from head
injuries caused by battering.' Diehl admitted that she had struck the child in
the head with a wooden paddle as many as thirty times and that she had struck
him directly on top of his head a few days before he died.4 ' Diehl was con-
victed of child neglect, assault and battery, abduction, and involuntary man-
slaughter.1 4' She was sentenced to a total of thirty-one years in prison, but
served less than half of that time.
4 2
In 1998, the Virginia state legislature passed an addition to the capital
murder statute.'43 Virginia Code Section 18.2-31(12) defines capital murder as
the "willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of a person under the age of
2520661.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Barbara Jo Archie was convicted of first-degree murder for killing her boyfriend's three-
year old daughter and sentenced to life imprisonment. Archie v. Commonwealth, 420 S.E.2d 718,
719 (Va. Ct. App. 1992). Thipsukon Arnold Rhodes killed her three-month old daughter; she was
charged with and convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to twenty years in prison. Rhodes
v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 95,96 (Va. 1989). Stacy Myers killed her newborn baby by placing
it inside a plastic bag where the child suffocated. Myers v. Commonwealth, No. 1780-92-1, 1994
WL 389748, at *1, *2 (Va. Ct. App. July 26, 1994). Myers was indicted for first-degree murder, she
had a bench trial, and the court convicted her of second-degree murder. Id., at *1. Autopsies of
Archie's victim and Rhodes's victim indicated a pattern of child abuse. Arhie, 420 S.E.2d at 719-
20; Rhodes, 384 S.E.2d at 96.
136. Diehl v. Commonwealth, 384 S.E.2d 801, 803 (Va. Ct. App. 1989).
137. Id. at 804.
138. Id. at 803.
139. Id. at 803-04.
140. Id. at 804.
141. Id. at 803.
142. Diehl, 384 S.E.2d at 803; Kerry Dougherty, The Re.Emetence of Karen Diehl Revives Horrors
of Abused Child, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Oct. 6, 2001, at B1, 2001 WL 26277916 (reporting that
Diehl now works in a facility for elderly people).
143. Seegeoerally VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Michie Supp. 2002) (amended 1998).
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fourteen by a person age twenty-one or older."1" This statute gives prosecutors
the authority to charge women who murder children with capital murder. In
January of 2000, Annabelis Corrales ("Corrales") smothered her newborn baby
in a white plastic trash bag.'45 Corrales was twenty-five years old at the time; she
was charged with first-degree murder, convicted of second-degree murder, and
sentenced to five years in prison.146 In October of 2000, Stacy Renee Atkinson
("Atkinson") beat her two-and-a-half-year old stepson to death.'47 The child's
body had fifty-one bruises and lacerations. 4 ' Although initially charged with
capital murder, prosecutors eventually negotiated a plea agreement; Atkinson was
sentenced to fifteen years in prison for second-degree murder.'49 In February of
2001, rescue workers discovered the body of a four-year old who died from a
severe beating.' Prosecutors charged the boy's twenty-two-year old mother
with second-degree murder and felony child abuse.' At the same time, prose-
cutors have not been reluctant to charge men with capital murder pursuant to
Section 18.2-31(12).152 In theory, the adoption of Section 18.2-31(12) should
have resulted in an increase of female capital murder charges and convictions.
In reality, prosecutorial discretion is still controlling. This development indicates
that the capital murder system is inequitable at every turn-attempting to change
144. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(12) (Michie Supp. 2002).
145. Kiran Krishnamurthy, woman Held in Death of Newborn, First-Degree Murder is Charged,
RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 21, 2000, at B4, 2000 WL 5027934.
146. See id.; Corrales v. Commonwealth, No. 2797-01-2, 2002 WL 31553222, at *1 (Va. Ct.
App. Nov. 19, 2002).
147. Alan Cooper, 15 Years in Toddkr's Death, RICH. TIMEs-DISPATCH, Oct. 5, 2001, at B3,
2001 WL 5335696.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Mike Allen, Bassett Woman Charged in 4-Year-Old Son's Death; Charge is Second-Degree Murder,
THE ROANOKE TIMEs, Apr. 3, 2001, at B4.
151. Id.
152. Jermaine Donel Poindexter has been charged with several counts of capital murder
including Section 18.2-31(12). Man Indicted; Death Brings Murder Charges, RICH. TIMEs-DIsPATCH,
Mar. 5, 2003, at B2, 2003 WL 8016016; see § 18.2-31(12) (defining capital murder as "[tihe willful,
deliberate, and premeditated killing of a person under the age of fourteen by a person twenty-one
or older").
Gregory Murphy was charged with capital murder for knifing an eight-year old boy to death.
Patricia Davis, Bill Would End Cap on Treating Suspects, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 2003, at T06, 2003 WL
2367681.
Orlando Covington was charged with capital murder for beating a three-year old to death.
Tom Campbell,Judge Finds Man Guilo in Beating Death ofBqy, RICH. TIMEs-DISPATCH,June 20,2002,
at B3, 2002 WL 7202970.
James Edward Knight was charged with capital murder for killing his infant daughter. Man
Sentenced to Life in Prison; Knight kilkd Infant Daughter, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 15, 2002, at B2,
2002 WL 7192116.
Eric A. Vickers was charged with capital murder for beating his girlfriend's son to death.
Woman Admits She Let Boyfriend Beat Son, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Feb. 12, 2002, at B2, 2002 WL
7191854.
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one portion of the system cannot ameliorate the inequity latent in the other
components.
The lack of women in Virginia's history of executions or currently on
Virginia's death row is not the result of a total lack of deserving female offend-
ers. Statutory construction, juries, judges, and prosecutors combine to create a
system with layers of protection for female defendants. This raises two ques-
tions, the first being whether Virginia's capital system creates two classes of
offenders, divided by gender. Male homicide offenders are eligible for the death
penalty; women are not. The fact that there are culpable female offenders in
Virginia and yet not a single final sentence of death has been imposed on a
woman indicates that the Virginia capital system has deemed death to be a
disproportionate penalty for one gender, but not the other. These conditions
make Virginia the ideal state to challenge the gender disparity in the application
of the death penalty; it actively uses its death system, but targets only men.
The second question raised is whether Virginia's statutory system violates
the Equal Protection clause in its determination of death-eligible offenses.
Virginia's capital system essentially creates two classes of murder, male felony
murder punishable by death and female domestic murder, punishable at most by
life imprisonment.'53 Is shooting a convenience store clerk in the commission
of a robbery truly a more dangerous crime than killing one's spouse to collect on
an insurance policy? If Virginia's capital system is based upon deterring the
types of murder that have the most deleterious effects upon society, the Com-
monwealth makes a value judgment that appears misguided at best and discrimi-
natory at worst.
III. Virginia's CapitalMurder Statute Is Unconstitutional
Virginia's capital system has three constitutional weaknesses. First, the
Virginia statute tends to exclude the types of homicide that women commit most
and even when women do commit a capital offense prosecutors tend not to
charge them under Section 18.2-31. With one exception, juries in the modem
era will not sentence a woman to death. These facts support the proposition
that evolving standards of decency have determined that executing a female
constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment; therefore, the statute violates the
Eighth Amendment. Second, the death penalty is disparately applied which
results in de facto discrimination and violates the Equal Protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Prosecutors choose not to charge women with capital
murder for the same crimes that essentially guarantee men a capital indictment. 4
Third, Virginia's statutory decision to label felony murder, but not domestic
murder, a capital offense creates an invidious classification which violates the
153. Even when women do commit felony murder, they do not receive sentences of death.
See supra notes 119-34 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 119-34, 145-52 and accompanying text.
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Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. The Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that are excessive or
disproportionate to the offense; a punishment that is either disproportionate or
excessive can be rendered cruel and unusual."'5 Whether or not a punishment
is disproportionate to the offense is determined by the standards which "cur-
rently prevail" within the collective criminal justice conscience. 6 The United
States Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia"57 framed its proportionality review
with the following words: " 'The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amend-
ment is nothing less than the dignity of man .... The Amendment must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
a maturing society.' ""' The Court has repeatedly relied on the "evolving
standards of decency" to refine its definition of cruel and unusual punishment." 9
The execution of women fits clearly into this pattern of evolving standards.
With every passing generation, fewer and fewer women have been executed until
such executions have all but ceased. 6 ' All parts of the legal system, judges,
prosecutors, and juries, have developed a habit of restraint when it comes to
executing a woman. Society has matured to a level at which the execution of a
woman offends its sense of decency. The execution of a woman is excessive and
disproportionate to any crime she may commit.
The United States Supreme Court catalogued the factors to consider in
weighing the evolving standards of decency in Coker v. Georgia.' At issue in
Cokerwas a Georgia statute which allowed for a capital sentence in cases of rape
155. Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2246-47 (2002) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the execution of the mentally retarded).
156. Id. at 2247.
157. 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002).
158. Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2247 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality
opinion)).
159. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330-331, 335 (1989) (relying on the evolving
standards of decency to deny petitioner's claim that the execution of the mentally retarded violated
the Eighth Amendment); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989) (considering evolving
standards of decency in determining if the execution of offenders aged sixteen and seventeen at the
time of the offense constituted cruel and unusual punishment); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,
405-06 (1986) (considering evolving standards of decency in determining if the execution of the
insane amounted to cruel and unusual punishment).
160. This observation does not ignore the fact that Texas, Florida, and Oklahoma have
increased their female executions in the past five years. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note
98. However, these three states are much in the minority. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note
12.
161. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597-98 (1977) (holding that capital punishment for the
crime of rape of an adult woman violates the Eighth Amendment protection from cruel and
unusual punishment).
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of an adult woman.162 Georgia was the last state to permit the death penalty for
rape, and the Court traced the progression of other death states abandoning the
penalty over time. 61 Similarly, most modem death states have abandoned
imposing the death penalty on women over a progression of time.' The only
difference is that in Coker, states altered their statutes to reflect the change in
societal norms. Of course, a state can limit its capital offenses without violating
the Constitution, but a state cannot limit its class of potential capital offenders
by gender without undermining the legitimacy of its capital system. Virginia will
not change its statute to reflect the fact that its citizens will not impose a sen-
tence of death on a female because it need not do so. The system in place
already achieves that goal without the brazenness of a statutory provision.
The Court in Coker also considered the findings of juries when it analyzed
evolving standards of decency. 6 ' The Court mentioned the fact that nine out
of ten juries in Georgia which heard a capital rape case did not impose a sen-
tence of death. 66 The Court in Coker relied on Gregg v. Georia'67 to state that
"[t]he jury.., is a significant and reliable objective index of contemporary values
because it is so directly involved."'68 The Coker Court went further than Gregg
and also stated:
What it is thus important to look to the sentencing decisions that
juries have made in the course of assessing whether capital punish-
ment is an appropriate penalty for the crime being tried. Of course,
the jury's judgment is meaningful only where the jury has an appropri-
ate measure of choice as to whether the death penalty is to be im-
posed.'69
In the state of Virginia, the jury has an "appropriate measure of choice," and
only one woman has received a sentence of death in the modem era. 7° The
Court in Coker relied in part on both the actions of state legislatures and the
decisions of juries. While the actions of legislatures are not as compelling as they
162. Id. at 586.
163. Id. at 594-96.
164. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., apra note 12 (listing thirty-eight states and the federal
government as death penalty jurisdictions).
165. Coker, 433 U.S. at 596-97.
166. Id. at 597 (stating that "it is true that in the vast majority of cases, at least 9 out of 10,
juries have not imposed the death sentence").
167. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
168. Coker, 433 U.S. at 596-97 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976)).
169. Coker, 433 U.S. at 596.
170. Id.; iee VA. CODEANN. § 19.2-264.4(D)-(E) (Michie 2000) (describing the role of the jury
in a capital sentencing proceeding). The one woman was Wincker, whose death sentence was
commuted by the trial judge. See supra note 118.
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were in Coker, the jury decisions in Virginia are very compelling. 171
The Court relied on evolving standards of decency again in Enmund v.
Florida1 72 to hold that the Eighth Amendment does not permit the execution of
a defendant who aids and abets a felony murder, but does not perform the actual
killing.173  In reliance on Coker, the Enmund Court looked to "the historical
development of the punishment at issue, legislative judgments, international
opinion, and the sentencing decisions juries have made before bringing its own
judgment to bear on the matter.' 1 74 At the time Enmund was decided, thirty-six
jurisdictions authorized the death penalty, but only eight jurisdictions authorized
its use on a felon who participated in a robbery that resulted in a felony murder,
but who did not participate in the murder itself.7 The Court held that this
"small minority" of jurisdictions did not overshadow the fact that standards of
decency had evolved in the remaining majority of death penalty jurisdictions.'
The Court found that because American juries have overwhelmingly "repudiated
imposition of the death penalty for crimes such as petitioner's," the conclusion
that society at large had rejected such a penalty was proper.'77 The Court
continued and stated:
The fact remains that we are not aware of a single person convicted
of felony murder over the past quarter century who did not kill or
attempt to kill, and did not intend the death of the victim, who has
been executed, and that only three persons in that category are pres-
ently sentenced to die.'78
In the matter of female executions, less than Enmunds small minority of jurisdic-
tions still carry out death sentences, a mere six out of thirty-nine.' 9 Further, in
Virginia, the Court's language regarding juries is actuated: not a single woman
who has been convicted of capital murder has received a final sentence of death,
not only in the past quarter century, but in the past ninety-one years. 80 In
applying the Enmund analysis to Virginia, it is apparent that Virginia has deter-
mined that death is a cruel and unusual punishment for women, despite the
gender-neutral language of its capital sentencing statutes.
The execution of women has always been limited; however, its dimunition
171. Coker, 433 U.S. at 597; see VA, CODE ANN.§ 19.2-264.4(D)-(E) (describing the role of the
jury in a capital sentencing proceeding).
172. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
173. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982).
174. Id. at 788-89.
175. Id. at 789.
176. Id. at 792.
177. Id. at 794.
178. Id. at 796.
179. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 12.
180. See DEATH PENALTY FORFEMALE OFFENDERSJANUARY 1,1973, THROUGH DECEMBER
31, 2002, supra note 109.
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has been even more pronounced in the last several decades. This gradual
transformation manifests an evolving standard of decency-what was once an
acceptable and proportionate method of punishment for women is now only
rarely administered. The United States Supreme Court has held that evolving
standards of decency and conventional norms are to be considered in the
regulation of the death penalty. The fact that only six states have executed
women in the past thirty years indicates that female executions have fallen
beyond the pale of standard decency. The remaining thirty-three death penalty
jurisdictions have essentially determined that execution is a cruel and unusual
punishment for women. It is true that none of the death penalty jurisdictions
limit their capital murder statutes to men; however, convictions of capital murder
and sentences of death are limited almost exclusively to men. While capital
murder statutes are not discriminatory on their face, the statistics support that
they are discriminatory in practice. Because of this disparate application, women
are benefitting from the justice system's silent consensus that, for them, execu-
tion is a cruel and unusual punishment. The death penalty in practice has
extended the Eighth Amendment to offer broader protection to women. If men
are not afforded the same protection, they have suffered a violation of their
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
B. Equal Protection: Invidious Appcation
The first hurdle to surmount in making an Equal Protection argument
under the Fourteenth Amendment is defining a legitimate suspect class. Histori-
cally, a gender classification that results in invidious discrimination has targeted
or affected women rather than men. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme
Court clarified that men, as well as women, can be members of a suspect class.
In Orrv. Orr,"' the Court reviewed an Alabama alimony statute which provided
that men, but not women, may be required to pay alimony in a divorce settle-
ment.'82 The Court found that Alabama could not justify a gender-biased statute
in this instance and held the alimony statute unconstitutional." 3 In reaching its
decision, the Court stated that "[t]he fact that the classification expressly discrim-
inates against men rather than women does not protect it from scrutiny."' 84
Prior to Orr, the Court made the same finding regarding male gender
classifications in Craig v. Boren.8 An Oklahoma statute prohibited the sale of
beer to men under the age of twenty-one and to women under the age of
181. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
182. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271 (1979) (holding a gender-biased alimony statute to be
unconstitutional).
183. Id. at 283.
184. Id. at 279.
185. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (holding a drinking age statute which distin-
guished between men and women to be unconstitutional).
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eighteen." 6 The Court held that men between the ages of eighteen and twenty
were subject to gender-based discrimination under this provision, and that
Oklahoma's governmental objective was not sufficient to validate the denial of
equal protection.'87 The Court determined that gender-biased statutes which
discriminate against men must withstand intermediate scrutiny to avoid violating
the Equal Protection clause.
However, this does not immediately create a suspect class of male death
penalty defendants. All of the death states, including Virginia, have gender-
neutral statutes; they do not discriminate on paper, although they do discriminate
in application. The United States Supreme Court has, however, implied that
even gender-neutral statutes must withstand scrutiny if they are discriminatory.
The Court applied intermediate scrutiny to men in MichaelM. v. Superior Courta8
and held that the government had a legitimate interest in discriminating against
men.'89 California had passed a statutory rape law which only prohibited and
punished men for the crime of statutory rape."9 The Court held that California's
governmental objectives were legitimate and, therefore, the discrimination was
not unconstitutional.'9" The Court also intimated that a gender-neutral statute
that in effect only prosecutes men would not be any different than a gender-
biased statute:
Petitioner contends that a gender-neutral statute would not hinder
prosecutions because the prosecutor could take into account the
relative burdens on females and males and generally only prosecute
males. But to concede this is to concede all. If the prosecutor, in
exercising discretion, will virtually always prosecute just the man and
not the woman, we do not see why it is impermissible for the legisla-
ture to enact a statute to the same effect.'92
The petitioner in Michael M. faced a gender-biased statute and argued that the
statute should have been gender-neutral.'93 He argued that if the state had an
interest in targeting men, then prosecutorial discretion under a gender-neutral
statute could fulfill the state's interest.9" The Court answered this argument by
stating that if the statute will have a gender-biased application, the bias could be
186. Id. at 192-93.
187. Id. at 204,210.
188. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
189. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 472-73 (1981) (upholding a statutory rape
law which only prohibited the unlawful conduct of men). For a gender classification to withstand
intermediate scrutiny it must bear a substantial relationship to "important governmental objectives."
Id. at 468-69 (quoting Craig, 429 U.S. at 197).
190. Id. at 466.
191. Id. at 479.
192. Id. at 474 n.9.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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plainly written into the statute.19 Even though the Court upheld the gender
discrimination in MichaelM., the Court's language supports the premise that it is
the discrimination itself-not just the language of the statute-that must survive
intermediate scrutiny. If the Court's words are applied to Virginia's capital
punishment system, then the distinction between a gender-neutral or a gender-
biased statute becomes less important. Whether Virginia's system by its statutory
terms punishes only men or whether prosecutorial discretion targets only men
becomes irrelevant. The discrimination is constitutional only if it withstands
intermediate scrutiny.
Men can be considered a suspect class and gender discrimination can occur
even when the statute in question is gender-neutral. Virginia has bestowed, in
practicality, an Eighth Amendment protection upon female homicide offenders.
This practice is revealed by the fact that even when women commit capital
crimes they are rarely charged with capital murder, and when they are charged,
they never receive a final sentence of death. Virginia has, therefore, determined
that the death penalty is a cruel and unusual punishment for women. Because
Virginia has not conferred this protection to men, it has engaged in gender
classification. Intermediate scrutiny requires that gender classifications serve
important governmental objectives and that they be substantially related to
meeting those objectives."" This analysis would require Virginia to offer a
governmental objective for executing male capital offenders and not female
capital offenders. Presumably, Virginia would argue that men perpetrate more
capital murders and therefore require a harsher penalty than female offenders.
In MichaelM., the Court upheld the rationale that men sometimes require greater
deterrence.
1. Distinguisbing Michael M. v. Superior Court
Gender discrimination in Virginia's capital system is distinguishable from
MichaelM. California's objective for gender discrimination in MichaelM. was to
prevent teenage pregnancy. 97 The state reasoned that even in statutory rapes
where the female is willing, the female bears the cost of the activity and does not
need an extra deterrent.' 98 Men, however, do not suffer the same way through
the hardships of pregnancy; therefore, it furthers a legitimate state interest to
impose a legal penalty on men alone in this situtation 99 The Court found that
California's objective of preventing teen pregnancy was legitimate."00 The Court
also agreed with the state that women already face a possible penalty for engag-
195. MicbadM., 450 U.S. at 474 n.9.
196. Craig 429 U.S. at 197.
197. MicbaelM., 450 U.S. at 471.
198. Id. at 473.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 472-73.
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ing in underage sex, while men do not.2"1 The Court concluded that punishing
only men for statutory rape was sufficiently related to the state's objective.0 2
The objective of Virginia's capital murder statute is to prevent certain kinds
of murder. No doubt, this objective is legitimate. To meet this objective,
Virginia creates a classification. Men can be sentenced to death; women cannot.
California had a reason for its classification, namely that women already face a
harsh penalty for their actions while men do not. This reasoning does not apply
in capital murder. When a woman commits capital murder she does not face any
consequences outside of the law that a man does not also suffer. There is then
no reason to add a legal penalty to men which is not imposed on women. If a
capital sentence is not necessary to deter a woman from committing capital
murder, it is not necessary to deter a man. Even though Virginia's objective of
preventing certain types of murder is legitimate, its means of only punishing men
is not substantially related. The Court's ruling in Michael M. creates a double-
edged sword for the gender classification inherent in Virginia's capital system.
The Court upheld the enforcement of a penalty against only male offenders, but
it upheld that enforcement to support a substantial relationship drawn much
closer than any Virginia might offer.
2. Distinguishing McCleskey v. Kemp
An element that cannot be ignored in a discussion of disparate gender
application of the death penalty is the United States Supreme Court's treatment
of disparate racial application of the death penalty. The Court in McClesky v.
Kemp 0 held that statistical evidence of racial disparities does not support an
inference of racism in individual cases. 2° The defendant in McChsky was a black
man charged with killing a white police officer.2" He contested his conviction
largely in reliance on the Baldus study, which indicated racial bias in capital
sentencing.2"6 The Court insisted that the defendant prove purposeful discrimi-
nation in his specific case; the defendant in McCleskg could not.20 7 However,
statistics indicate a more severe gender disparity than racial disparity. As of the
year 2000, African-Americans made up 12.3 % of the total population and yet
they made up 35 % of the modem era executions, 288 out of 838.2° In terms
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
204. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987) (holding that statistical evidence is not
enough to support an inference of discrimination in a specific case).
205. Id. at 283.
206. Id. at 292.
207. Id. at 293-96.
208. Statistics were tallied by the United States Census Bureau at http://www.census.gov
/population/cen2000/adas/black a.pdf; DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., RACE OF DEFENDANTS
EXECUTED SINCE 1976, athttp://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicrace.html (last updated Mar. 20,
2003).
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of gender though, men make up only 49.1 % of the population, yet they account
for more than 99 % of modem day executions. 2°9 This amounts to a racial
discrepancy of about 24 %, but a gender discrepancy of about 68 %. Since 1976,
Virginia has executed eighty-seven men and zero women. The Court in
McCleskgy refused to make statistical inferences in capital cases; nevertheless, this
kind of statistical disparity can be a compelling starting point.
The Court in McCkskey refused, even in the face of compelling evidence, to
conclude that one group was being adversely affected by the system without
proof of individual discrimination in each individual case. Perhaps if the argu-
ment were posited from a different angle, a gender argument could be more
compelling. The racial challenge failed because it could not show that the state
was purposely discriminating against one group. If the gender argument is
phrased in terms of a denial of benefits it could be more persuasive.
Female offenders are granted benefits and protections that men are denied.
Prosecutorial discretion results in fewer women being charged with capital
murder than could be and more women receiving plea arrangements for capital
crimes. Even when women are tried for capital offenses, they appear to benefit
from mitigators that stereotypically apply to them and to be protected from
statutory aggravators that stereotypically do not. Finally, most juries view
women as less dangerous and more open to rehabilitation than their male
counterparts. This perception provides them with the benefit of almost always
receiving a life sentence over a death sentence; men are denied this benefit. If
these were benefits that the legal system could simply confer upon men, a
remedy would be available to solve the Equal Protection violation; the courts
could provide the same benefits and protections to both genders. Realistically,
these intangible benefits cannot be given to men. Because the capital system
bestows benefits upon women that ultimately award them life over death, and
because these benefits cannot be given to men, the Virginia death penalty statute
is invidiously applied in violation of the Equal Protection clause and is unconsti-
tutional.
C. Equal Protection: Invidious Classification
The United States Supreme Court held in Skinner v. Oklahoma l° that when
a penalty is applied to two classes of offenders differently and the intrinsic
offense is the same, an Equal Protection violation has occurred.21 ' At issue in
Skinner was a statute that required the sterilization of felons who had been
209. See UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND COUNTY QUICKFACTS, PEOPLE
QUICKFACrS, at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.hil (last visited Mar. 18,2003);
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., supra note 7.
210. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
211. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that Oklahoma's sterilization
statute violates the Equal Protection clause).
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convicted of a felony two or more tdmes. 212 However, the statute included an
exception for certain felonies such as embezzlement, revenue fraud, and political
offenses.213 The Court pointed out that under this statute an embezzler who
appropriates his employer's funds three times will not face sterilization, yet a
chicken thief who raids a chicken coop three times will be sterilized.2" 4 The
intrinsic offense, the taking of property, is the same, yet both offenders face
wholly different penalties.2"5 The Court treated this distinction with great
seriousness because the penalty was so great. The Court described the penalty
of sterilization as follows:
The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, farreaching and
devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or
types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disap-
pear. There is no redemption for the individual whom the law touches. Any
experiment which the State conducts is to his irparable injury. He is forever
deprived of a basic liberty. We mention these matters not to reexam-
ine the scope of the police power of the States. We advert to them
merely in emphasis of our view that strict scrutiny of the classification
which a State makes in a sterilization law is essential, lest unwittingly,
or otherwise, invidious discriminations are made against groups or
types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just
and equal laws.2" 6
Like sterilization, the penalty of death causes irreparable injury and obliterates
the possibility for redemption. Death also forever deprives the defendant of the
basic liberty to continue his life. Because of these very concerns, the Court in
Skinner applied strict scrutiny to the state's classification of crimes.2 17 An argu-
ment can be made that under Skinner, classifications that attach to the implemen-
tation of the death penalty should also be subject to strict scrutiny.
Clearly, Skinner dealt with classifications in offenses rather than gender.
However, the application of the death penalty in Virginia essentially amounts to
two different penalties for the same intrinsic offense. Most of the capital murder
convictions in Virginia are for some type of felony murder.218 Of the eighty-
seven men executed since 1981, fifty-three men were sentenced to death for
felony murder.2 19 By reviewing newsworthy cases from the year 2001, it appears
212. Id. at 536.
213. Id. at 537.
214. Id. at 538-39.
215. Id. at 539.
216. Id. at 541 (emphasis added).
217. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
218. See infra note 219.
219. Since 1976, thirty-two men have been executed in Virginia pursuant to VA. CODE ANN.
18.2-31(4) (Michie Supp. 2002) (defining capital murder as "[tjhe willful, deliberate, and premedi-
tated killing of any person in the commission of robbery or attempted robbery"). See general4
Whitley v. Bair, 802 F.2d 1487 (4th Cir. 1986); Akers v. Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 674 (Va.
2000); Roach v. Commonwealth, 468 S.E.2d 98 (Va. 1996); Chandler v. Commonwealth, 455
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that women commit a broad range of homicides; they do not, however, typically
commit felony murder in the commission of a robbery, a sex offense, or an
abduction. Women in Virginia are more likely to murder a family member than
to commit murder in the course of a robbery.2" This is not to say that all
S.E.2d 219 (Va. 1995);Joseph v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 862 (Va. 1995); Graham v. Common-
wealth, 459 S.E.2d 97 (Va. 1995); Fry v. Commonwealth, 463 S.E.2d 433 (Va. 1995); Chichester
v. Commonwealth, 448 S.E.2d 638 (Va. 1994); Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 360 (Va.
1994); Dubois v. Commonwealth, 435 S.E.2d 636 (Va. 1993); King v. Commonwealth, 416 S.E.2d
669 (Va. 1992); Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 410 S.E.2d 254 (Va. 1991); Quesinberry v. Common-
wealth, 402 S.E.2d 218 (Va. 1991); George v. Commonwealth, 411 S.E.2d 12 (Va. 1991); Savino
v. Commonwealth, 391 S.E.2d 276 (Va. 1990); Stout v. Commonwealth, 376 S.E.2d 288 (Va. 1989);
Watkins v. Commonwealth, 385 S.E.2d 50 (Va. 1989); Bennett v. Commonwealth, 374 S.E.2d 303
(Va. 1988); Mackall v. Commonwealth, 372 S.E.2d 759 (Va. 1988); Turner v. Commonwealth, 364
S.E.2d 483 (Va. 1988); Correll v. Commonwealth, 352 S.E.2d 352 (Va. 1987); Townes v. Common-
wealth, 362 S.E.2d 650 (Va. 1987); Gray v. Commonwealth, 356 S.E.2d 157 (Va. 1987); Pope v.
Commonwealth, 360 S.E.2d 352 (Va. 1987); Wise v. Commonwealth, 337 S.E.2d 715 (Va. 1985);
Boggs v. Commonwealth, 331 S.E.2d 407 (Va. 1985); Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 807
(Va. 1985); Peterson v. Commonwealth, 302 S.E.2d 520 (Va. 1983); Bunch v. Commonwealth, 304
S.E.2d 27 1(Va. 1983); Clanton v. Commonwealth, 286 S.E.2d 172 (Va. 1982); Briley v. Common-
wealth, 273 S.E.2d 48 (Va. 1980); Coppola v. Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 797 (Va. 1979).
Since 1976, fourteen men have been executed in Virginia pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-
31(5) (Michie Supp. 2002) (defining capital murder as "[t]he willful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing of any person in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape or attempted rape, forcible
sodomy or attempted forcible sodomy or object sexual penetration"). See generaly Wilson v.
Greene, 155 F.3d 396 (4th Cir. 1998); Patterson v. Commonwealth, 551 S.E.2d 332 (Va. 2001);
Mickens v. Commonwealth, 478 S.E.2d 302 (Va. 1996); Barnabei v. Commonwealth, 477 S.E.2d
270 (Va. 1996); Breard v. Commonwealth, 445 S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1994); Chabrol v. Commonwealth,
427 S.E.2d 374 (Va. 1993); Satcher v. Commonwealth, 421 S.E.2d 821 (Va. 1992); O'Dell v.
Commonwealth, 364 S.E.2d 491 (Va. 1988); Tuggle v. Commonwealth, 334 S.E.2d 838 (Va. 1985);
Clozza v. Commonwealth, 321 S.E.2d 273 (Va. 1984); Coleman v. Commonwealth, 307 S.E.2d 864
(Va. 1983); Justus v. Commonwealth, 283 S.E.2d 905 (Va. 1981); Waye v. Commonwealth, 251
S.E.2d 202 (Va. 1979); Mason v. Commonwealth, 254 S.E.2d 116 (Va. 1979).
Since 1976, two men have been executed in Virginia pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. % 18.2-
31(4) and (5). See generaly Wright v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d 361 (Va. 1994); Fitzgerald v.
Commonwealth, 292 S.E.2d 798 (Va. 1982).
Since 1976, two men have been executed in Virginia pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(4)
and VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (1) (defining capital murder as "[t] he willful, deliberate, and premedi-
tated killing of any person in the commission of abduction..."). SeegeneralCardwellv. Common-
wealth, 450 S.E.2d 146, 148-49 (Va. 1994); Strickler v. Commonwealth, 404 S.E.2d 227, 229-30
(Va. 1991).
Ronald Hoke was executed for the crimes of capital murder pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. §5
18.2-31(1),(4) and (5). Seegeneral# Hoke v. Commonwealth, 377 S.E.2d 595, 596-97 (Va. 1989).
Everett Mueller was executed for the crimes of capital murder pursuant to VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 18.2-31(5) and (1). Seegeneraly Mueller v. Commonwealth, 422 S.E.2d 380, 383 (Va. 1992).
220. In the year 2001, women were charged with or sentenced to at least thirteen murders in
which the victim was a family member or a boyfriend. See Mike Allen, Bassett Woman Charged in 4-
Year-Old Son's Death Charge is Second-Degree Murder, ROANOKE TIMES, Apr. 3, 2001, at B4; Mark
Bowes, Woman Chaged in Husband's Death; She Said She Suffered From Domestic Abuse, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, Oct. 28,2001, at B7, 2001 WL 8011224;Jay Conley, Moneta Woman Charged iWith Kilng
Mother, ROANOKE TIMES, Nov. 10, 2001, at B3, 2001 WL 25129285; Alan Cooper, [Woman Gets 22
Years for K'lkng Haf Sister, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Apr.20, 2001, at B3, 2001 WL 5321170; Tad
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women who kill in Virginia are victims of abusive relationships or act in self-
defense.221 Women in Virginia have committed violent homicides, but because
their murders typically lack an accompanying felony, they escape capital murder
charges. For example, Shirley Elaine Phillips soaked her husband in gasoline
while he was asleep in their bed and lit him on fire. 2 Phillips was charged with
second-degree murder.23 Latasha May Keen struggled with an eighty-two year
old man and then hit him in the head with a shotgun at least twelve times, cut
him nine times with a blade, and stabbed him six times. 224 Keen was convicted
of second-degree murder and sentenced to a total of twenty-three years, ten of
which were suspended.22 Men are not the sole perpetrators of violent homi-
cides; they simply commit more of the homicides that Virginia has deemed to be
death worthy. Because men are overwhelmingly the perpetrators of felony
murder, which is the most common death offense in Virginia, and women
offenders typically commit domestic homicides, a non-death offense, the Skinner
error has occurred. The same intrinsic offense is met with very different penal-
ties.
The Skinner analysis then considered whether the government has a com-
pelling interest to justify its classification. This analysis would force the
Commonwealth of Virginia to argue that the killing of another person during the
Dickens, lWoman Pleads No Contest in Kilng ofBoyftiend, ROANOKETIMES, Mar. 24,2001, atB 1, 2001
WL 5360934; Tad Dickens, Woman Pleads No Contest In Kiling of Boyfliend, ROANOKE TIMES, Mar.
24, 2001, at B1, 2001 WL 5360938; Tad Dickens, Virginia Woman Will Serve 10-Year Sentence,
ROANOKE TIMES, Aug. 30, 2001, at B1, 2001 WL 25122548; Noreen Gillespie, Woman Gets 28
Years in Slaying, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH,June 9, 2001, at B2, 2001 WL 5325636; Chris L. Jenkins,
Wife Charged With Murder in Death of Husband, WASH. POST, May 20, 2001, at T03, 2001 WL
17629700; Lou Misselhorn, Local Prosecutors: Daughter, BoyfriendKiledMom, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT,
Sept. 18, 2001, at B3, 2001 WL 26275587; Shay Wessol, Guilo Plea Entered in Fake Suidde Case,
ROANOKE TIMES, Feb. 14,2001, at B2, 2001 WL 5357202; Patrick Wilson, Wif Admits Setting Man
on Fire, VIRGINIA FIRE CHIEF'S ASSoc. ONLINE, Nov. 8, 2001,
http://www.sfcav.org/2001_wifesetsfire
11.htm; Woman Charged With Husband's Death, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 28,2001, at B7, 2001
WL 5340486; THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Woman ConvictedofMurderHits Officer; FacesAdditionalFelony
Charges (Nov. 17, 2001) (on file with author).
221. Five of the instances cited supra note 220 contained allegations of abuse. Tad Dickens,
Virginia Women Will Serve 10-Year Sentence, ROANOKE TIMES, Aug. 30, 2001, at B1, 2001 WL
25122548; Tad Dickens, Woman Pleads No Contest In Kiling of Boyfriend, ROANOKE TIMES, Mar. 24,
2001, at B1, 2001 WL 5360938; Noreen Gillespie, Woman Gets 28 Years in Slaying, RICH. TIMES
DISPATCH, June 9, 2001, at B2, 2001 WL 5325636; Shay Wessol, Guily Pka Entered in Fake Suidde
Case, ROANOKE TIMES, Feb. 14, 2001, at B2, 2001 WL 5357202; Patrick Wilson, Wife Admits Setting
Man on Fire, VIRGINIA FIRE CHIEF'S ASSOC. ONLINE, Nov. 8, 2001,
www.sfcav.org/2001_wifesetsfirel 1 .htm.
222. Patrick Wilson, WifeAdmitsSettingMan on Fire, VIRGINIA FIRE CHIEF'S Assoc. ONLINE,
Nov. 8, 2001, www.sfcav.org/2001_wifesetsfirel 1.htm.
223. Id
224. Alan Cooper, Woman Sentenced in Death ofNeighbor, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH, Mar. 8,2001,
at B5, 2001 WL 5317484.
225. Id.
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commission of a robbery, rape, or abduction is more detrimental to society than
the killing of a family member and, therefore, requires greater deterrence.
However, the nature of a felony murder already draws a harsher penalty which
could afford extra deterrence. The offender will face punishment for first-degree
murder and the underlying offense. If the Commonwealth tries to argue that
felony murder is significantly more prevalent than domestic homicide and thus
has a greater detrimental effect on society, the Commonwealth would be factu-
ally correct. During the year 2000, 468 murders occurred in Virginia.2 6 One
hundred and twenty-nine of these murders involved family violence.2' Assum-
ing that a large percentage of the remaining 340 murders were committed in the
course of a felony, the state could argue that felony murder is more prevalent
than domestic homicide. However, this does not account for the damage done
to entire families that suffer from the loss of both the victim and the offender.
The Commonwealth's argument that felony murder has a greater detrimental
impact on society than domestic homicide is tenuous at best. One could argue
that domestic homicide creates a deeper impact on society than felony murder
because it disrupts and often destroys the family.
The final part of the strict scrutiny test demands that the state's means are
narrowly tailored to their objective. If Virginia's objective in punishing felony
murder with a capital sentence is to deter criminals from murdering innocent
people while in the commission of other offenses, then its means are not nar-
rowly tailored. Like the sterilization at issue in Skinner, the death penalty irrepa-
rably deprives particular criminals of the basic right, namely, the right to life.
Yet, the statute does not imply that such drastic deterrence is necessary for a
similar intrinsic offense-domestic homicide. In both offenses, a murder takes
the life of an innocent victim. The Commonwealth then finds that a prison term
is adequate to deter domestic homicide, but that death is necessary to deter
felony murder. This creates two different penalties for the same intrinsic offense
and violates Skinner. If life imprisonment is an adequate deterrent for domestic
homicide, then the death penalty for felony murder is not sufficiently narrowly
tailored to meet the Commonwealth's objective of deterring the murder of
innocent people. The statute creates an invidious classification in violation of
the Equal Protection clause.
226. VIRGINIA STATE POLICE: CRIME STATISTICS, MURDER/NONNEGLIGENT MANSLAUGH-
TER OFFENDERS BY AGE, GENDER, AND RACE 12, at http://www.vsp.state.va.us/Cnme in_
Virginia_2000.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2003).
227. VIRGINIANS AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: DV FACTS, atwww.vadv.org/facts.html
(last visited Mar. 18, 2003).
2003]
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL
The lesson of Skinner lies in the fact that drastic punishments which have
irreparable effects upon defendants require careful scrutiny and application.
When the application of an extreme punishment is mired in questionable classifi-
cations and distinctions created by the state, that punishment should fall beyond
the pale of acceptability. State sterilization is no longer practiced in any context
and whenever a revitalization is attempted, the same problem of the state
determining which crimes and criminals are deserving of such an extreme
punishment quashes its use. Like sterilization, the death penalty in Virginia
irreparably robs particular classes of defendants of a fundamental right based
upon state determinations of which degrees of the same crime are arguably more
detrimental to society. Like the use of sterilization, the use of capital punish-
ment in Virginia should be considered too inequitable for further use.
IV. Conclusion
The United States continues to defy international opinion by asserting that
the death penalty is an appropriate punishment in extreme cases. Yet, American
society grimaces at the prospect of executing a woman, even for atrocious
crimes. This perplexing dynamic is particularly apparent in Virginia because it
is a state that regularly carries out the executions of its male offenders and
uniformly spares the lives of its female offenders. Death penalty jurisdictions
must reconcile the fact that they are cavalier with the lives of offending males,
while they are appalled by the notion of taking the lives of offending females.
American society has progressed to a level of decency that practically prohibits
the execution of women. At this juncture, states must decide if they will recon-
cile their discriminatory systems by including male offenders in this circle of
decency or if they will settle for regression and remedy the situation with a rash
of female executions.
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